Basic Issues of Cultural Interaction: A European Perspective by Jorn Rüsen
Basic Issues of Cultural Interaction: A
European Perspective
著者 Jorn Rusen
journal or
publication title
Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia
volume 2
page range 5-14
year 2011-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10112/4271
Basic Issues of Cultural Interaction: 
A European Perspective 
Jörn Rüsen＊
Abstract
 The paper concentrates on the issue of ethnocentrism in cultural interaction. 
It briefl y mentions the East Asian case and mainly tackles the European one. 
It gives examples of ethnocentric attitudes in history, but its main point is 
presenting examples of overcoming the unbalanced evaluation in expressing 
cultural identity and difference by means of new forms of generating a sense 
of history. Examples are discussed as indicators of new approaches to dealing 
with morality beyond the highly problematic distinction between good and 
evil along the line of self and other.
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1. Cultural Interaction in East Asia: The Issue of Identity
 I would like to focus this paper on a very specifi c issue of cultural inter-
action, the issue of identity formation through historical thinking. History is 
an important element and medium of cultural interaction. By representing the 
past for the sake of the present and future, it tackles the very specifi c and 
fundamental relationship of a people to their own selves and self-awareness. 
This relationship is called cultural identity, although the term is highly 
controversial. But if the term “cultural identity” is defi ned as an answer to the 
question of who somebody is, we should not have any diffi culties in using it. 
Its existence as a cultural phenomenon and its importance for human life are 
evident. I think we all can agree that it is history, in its various forms and 
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manifestations, that tells people who they are.1
 I am deeply convinced that in cultural interaction in East Asia, elements 
that matter to identity are involved.2 This is already the case when the term 
“East Asia” is used. It defi nes a certain kind of belonging, of communality, of 
sharing something important for the order and set up of the life of the people. 
It defi nes borders beyond which others who do not belong to one’s realm of 
life live. So when we discuss the issue of East Asian relationships, there will 
always be a silent participant in this discussion: the non-East Asian. Since I 
belong to a people outside the borders of East Asia, I am interested in 
refl ecting on my role as a member of the excluded peoples in contributing to 
a defi nition of the realm of East Asian interaction.
 It would be too easy to defi ne the realm of interaction we call East Asia 
by the otherness of non-East Asians. Even discourse within East Asia has 
elements of belonging and of being different, of self and otherness. The 
reason is simple: East Asia is a network of relationships of different peoples 
and nations, and they can convincingly speak about their common ground 
only if they are aware that their internal differences—being Chinese, 
Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc.—are minor in respect to a major form of 
otherness. (I do not have to tell you that even Taiwan itself is such a network 
and not a coherent unifi ed culture.3)
 The major otherness is, of course, the Western one. East Asia is different 
from South Asia as well, and I believe that the cultural differences between 
India and China are in many respects deeper than those between China and 
the West (e.g., in historical thinking). But when it comes to defi ning a 
cultural realm of interaction, the West has more power to demarcate than all 
other non-Western cultures.
 I now wish to tackle an element in establishing cultural differences shared 
in most, if not all, cases of dealing with cultural differences. It is a certain 
way of using values to characterize self and otherness. In most cases of iden-
tity formation, the reference to oneself is brought about by self-confi dence 
and a fundamental interest in creating a positive self image. So the idea of 
one’s own cultural identity is loaded with positive values. Bearing these 
 1 See Jürgen Straub, ed., Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2005).,
 2 Huang Chun-Chieh addressed this issue correctly as the interrelationship of self 
and other and calls it a major theme of cultural interaction in East Asia. See 
Chun-Chieh Huang, “Some Observations on the Study of the History of 
Cultural Interactions in East Asia,” Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia 
1 (2010): 11–35, esp. 24–26.
 3 This can easily be demonstrated by the role of the Aborigines in Taiwanese 
cultural identity.
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values, in one’s own image as presented in one’s own history, has the posi-
tive potential of serving practical purposes in cultural orientation. So identity 
is loaded with values, and this impact of values has consequences for the 
image of others. For a people to clearly distinguish themselves from others, 
the others must be attributed values of minor esteem; their image may even 
bear negative traits and values.
2. The Power of Ethnocentrism 
 In the use of history to create a cultural identity, a specifi c term character-
izes this unequal attribution of values and its consequent evaluation. We call 
it ethnocentrism.4 There is general consent concerning the problematic impact 
of ethnocentrism on intercultural communication and cultural interaction. 
Since all participants in intercultural communication use the same ethnocen-
tric logic, they create tensions and even confl icts in encounters. Mutual 
devaluation constitutes what Samuel Huntington has called a “clash of 
civilizations.”5
 In the East-West encounter, this clash is evident. There is a growing 
tendency in non-Western intellectual life to criticize Western cultural domina-
tion in the various processes of modernization and globalization. This 
tendency ends up seeking to get rid of Western domination, mainly in the 
realm of culture. Postcolonialism is a very prominent example of this. 
Another tendency is the emphasis today on indigenous traditions in various 
disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.6 The problem in these wide-
spread tendencies of intercultural discourse lies not in the fact that criticism 
is directed against Western ethnocentrism, but in how it is so directed. In this 
negative antithetic, the logic of ethnocentrism is not given up, but rather is 
reproduced and confi rmed. In non-Western orientations, Western approaches 
to cultural orientation in trans- and intercultural communication are evaluated 
 4 See Jörn Rüsen, “How to Overcome Ethnocentrism: Approaches to a Culture 
of Recognition by History in the 21st Century,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian 
Studies 1, no. 1 (June 2004): 59–74; also in “Historians and Ethics,” theme 
issue, History and Theory 43 (2004): 118–129; Jörn Rüsen, “Tradition and 
Identity: Theoretical Refl ections and the European Example,” Taiwan Journal 
of East Asian Studies 1, no. 2 (December 2004): 135–158.
 5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
 6 See, e.g., Kwang-Kuo Hwang, “New Approach of Indigenous Social Psychology 
in the Age of Globalization,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 2 
(issue 12) (December 2009): 111–130; Bor-Shiuan Cheng, Yi-Cheng Lin, 
Li-Fang Chou, “Chinese Organizational Behaviour Studies in the Age of 
Globalization,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 2 (issue 12) 
(December 2009): 131–161.
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as aggressive and devastating, or they are marginalized, if not suppressed, so 
that non-Western orientations can come to the fore as alternative values. 
Engaging in a thought experiment, we can observe a well-established strategy 
of reproducing an ethnocentric attitude by exchanging the values in one’s own 
image for those of the other. Defi ning qualities are replaced by making new 
defi nitions. Thus white is turned into black, black into white, or civilization 
into barbarism, and barbarism into civilization. but the ethnocentric structure 
remains. 
 Take for example the general trend of victimization in present-day iden-
tity politics. When characterizing the other as perpetrator, as it is done with 
the domination of Western culture in modern history, victims consequently 
and automatically appear as innocent. They are the good guys, no matter what 
the background is. Shared universal morality makes this strategy of victim-
ization possible and gives it intellectual power.
 A short look at the discussion about intercultural comparison in historical 
thinking may bring the power of unequal evaluation to the fore. Recent inter-
pretations of East Asian historical thinking claim as a new insight the 
achievements of East Asia in developing the historicity of the human world. 
With their argumentation, they break the power of the old academically 
established Western paradigm.7 Yet as the paradigm for historicity, they only 
replace the Western model with an East Asian one. The dichotomy remains.8 
3. Some Examples in the East and West
 The logic of ethnocentrism in forming cultural identity is universal and 
deeply rooted in the human mind. Hence, we fi nd it in cultural interaction in 
East Asia as well as that in the West. The history of the Sino-Japanese rela-
tionship is full of ethnocentric devaluation of the other. And the strategy of 
victimization plays an enormous role even today. This can be seen in how the 
 7 See Chun-Chieh Huang, “The Defi ning Character of Chinese Historical 
Thinking,” History and Theory 46 (May 2007): 180–188; Masayuki Sato, “The 
Archetype of History in the Confucian Ecumene,” History and Theory 46, no. 
2 (May 2007): 218–232.
 8 I think that the only way of avoiding the dichotomy is the construction of a 
parameter of comparison based on anthropological universals. See Jörn Rüsen, 
“Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparison of 
Historiography,” “Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective,” theme 
issue, History and Theory 35 (1996): 5–22; revised version in Jörn Rüsen, 
History: Narration, Interpretation, Orientation (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2005), pp. 109–128; Chinese translation: “Kua wenhua bijiaoshixue de yixie 
lilun quxiang,” in Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Axel Schneider, eds., 
Zhongguo shixueshi yantaohui: Cong bijiao guandian chufa lunwenji (Taipei: 
Taoxiang Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 151–176.
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Chinese and Japanese refer to the horrifi c events of their common contempo-
rary history. 
 The most shocking incident was, of course, the Nanjing massacre. Its 
symbolic representation in the Nanjing Memorial includes heart-rending 
pictures, culminating in the statue of a woman, presumably a mother. This 
statue may represent the loss of husbands and brothers and, most heart-
breaking, of innocent children, but it may also represent the nation itself—
mother China complaining of the murder of 300,000 people. What do her 
features express? Not suffering, not mourning, but energetic strength (look at 
the set of her legs) and a kind of heroism. And cannot we even detect the 
desire for revenge in the clenched fi st? There is an inscription commemo-
rating the murder of 30,000 disarmed soldiers and 20,000 commoners at the 
riverside of Swallow Cliff in December 1937: “Let those of future genera-
tions use this tablet as a mirror into the past and let us strive to make the 
nation strong, to revitalize China and support peace throughout the world.” 
Here, along with exasperation, we can detect symbols of power and language 
suited to ethnocentric discourses. 
 Similar ethnocentrism can be seen in the Korean-Japanese relationship on 
the level of images. In a comic strip e.g. Japanese fi gures have round eyes 
(like Westerners’), whereas Korean fi gures have slanted eyes (as most East 
Asians have). This example is interesting in two respects: On the level of 
Japanese popular culture, it shows the traditional anti-Korean prejudice prev-
alent in Japan. But on a hidden level, it shows an internalized Western 
element in the Japanese self-presentation. Here with a widespread and 
mentally powerful physiognomic dichotomy between East and West, we see 
Western preeminence internalized. On a subconscious level, authors of these 
images have already taken sides with the Western other. Even within the 
dichotomy between self and the other, the other can become a part of one’s 
self image.9 
4. Good and Evil in Intercultural Relationships
 Discrimination against the other is a necessary mental operation of iden-
tity formation. So we cannot simply negate or completely overcome it. But 
this does not mean that ethnocentric attitudes are unavoidable and always the 
 9 In a brilliant analysis Shingo Shimada showed that in the process of Japan’s 
modernization, the Japanese concept of national peculiarity, emphasizing its 
fundamental difference from the West, genuine Western ideas of what Japan is 
about played an enormous role. So the West was effective even in another 
culture’s attempts at becoming different from it. See Shingo Shimada, Die 
Erfindung Japans: Kulturelle Wechselwirkung und nationale 
Identitätskonstruktion (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000).
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same in containing aggressive elements. They can be tamed, civilized, and 
even overcome without giving up the categorical distinction between self and 
others. (Such is tried in topical intellectual discourse on identity. Here the 
plausibility of a basic and insurmountable difference between self and others 
is contradicted by introducing the category of hybrids.10) I have discussed 
elsewhere the logical possibilities of such a change in the strategy of identity 
formation.11 I will not repeat that argument here. Instead, I will concentrate 
on one essential element, the use of moral criteria in distinguishing self and 
otherness. 
 How does ethnocentrism treat moral evaluation? The distinction between 
good and evil in history is usually cast so as to ascribe good to the image of 
oneself and evil to the image of the other. There are numerous examples in 
historiography all over the world. I will only present one case in European 
history, namely the war cemeteries in France after World War I. The dead 
German soldiers were given black crosses with their names inscribed on 
them, whereas the French soldiers killed in action against the Germans got 
white crosses (on a subconscious level, white stands for innocence, black for 
the contrary). Thus the living, in their commemoration, ascribe national iden-
tity even to the postmortem existence of dead soldiers.
5. Civilizing Ethnocentrism
 How can such inequality in evaluation be transformed into a more balanced 
relationship between self and others? I would like to present two answers to 
this question.
a. Equality and Equity
 The fi rst answer is, By founding this relationship on the principles of 
equality and equity. These principles, a rather late achievement of cultural 
evolution, are not at all about self-understanding. They say that every human 
being has value, or in the words of Immanuel Kant, that every human being 
is always more than a means to the purpose of others, that he is a purpose 
unto himself.12 Where these principles stem from is an open question.
 In the West, they were essential ideas behind a structural reorganization 
10 The metaphor says it already: hybrids are infertile.
11 See note 4.
12 “Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, 
not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his 
actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always 
regarded at the same time as an end.” (Immanuel Kant, Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals [1st edition, Riga: Johann Friedrich 
Hartknoch, 1785], p. 65)
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of social and political life in the second half of the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth centuries. Before this change took place, human life was 
organized along the lines of social inequality (only in the fi eld of religious 
belief were matters different). In fact, this was the case all over the world. 
Social differences determined all the main fi elds of culture. Confucian ethics, 
for example, established rules for human relationships by addressing social 
difference. The rules for parents and children were different, as were the rules 
for nobles and peasants. Western equality expressed itself in rules tran-
scending these differences, like Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. 
 Since they stem from the West, is it problematic for non-Western intel-
lectuals to accept these fundamental principles? If they refuse to accept them 
for this reason, they confi rm the evaluative differences that they are criti-
cizing in Western cultural domination. So these principles ought to be agreed 
upon in a transcultural way. There are enough starting points for their legiti-
mation in non-Western traditions as well.13
 Take the idea of equality and its consequence of mutual recognition, for 
example. The idea of equality is a necessary condition for replacing the 
ethnocentric logic of unequal evaluation with a humanistic logic of mutual 
recognition. Ethnocentrism negates the possibility of ascribing high human 
qualities to others simply because they are different. Equality does not 
exclude moral discrimination and devaluation; it only demands principles of 
evaluation that are valid for everybody, despite differences between self and 
others. Equality negates any attempt to ascribe moral qualities to ethnic affi l-
iation as a means of differentiation. It also forbids any double morality based 
on different standards of treating people. 
b. Self-Criticism: Integrating the Shadow 
 The second way of overcoming ethnocentrism involves a specifi c mental 
strategy of identity formation. Specifi cally, it involves treatment of those 
elements within oneself that cannot be integrated into a positive image of 
oneself. One’s self-esteem is usually stabilized by means of a strategy of 
exporting and projecting these dark elements onto the image of others. One 
thus makes others a part of oneself, like a shadow cast by oneself in the light 
of self-affi rmation. It is this self-alienation in constructing the other that gives 
ethnocentric attitudes their aggressive bitterness and makes them politically so 
dangerous. To overcome this confl ict-generating mental strategy, it is neces-
sary to accept the existence of a shadow within oneself. We all know that this 
is one of the most diffi cult tasks in doing history and establishing a public 
13 A striking example of transcultural validity is the invention of zero by the 
Indians. No one outside India feels culturally alienated when using it.
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historical culture. Such critical self-reference requires a good deal of self-
empowerment. It demands humility, ambivalence toward the self, and the 
ability to accept unwelcome facts and insults to one’s self-esteem.
 But such ambivalence toward the self may lead to a new relationship 
between oneself and others. Only if you acknowledge wounds you have 
infl icted upon others, crimes you have committed against them, can you 
prepare the ground for reconciliation. Recognizing injuries is a necessary 
precondition for reconciliation, without which the continuity of moral exclu-
sion in cultural interaction cannot be broken. Recent trends in historical 
culture show that this is possible. 
6. European Approaches to a New Historical Culture14 
 Acknowledging the dark elements in one’s own history to the victims can 
motivate them to overcome the moral exclusion that is a natural consequence 
of their suffering. A remarkable example of accepting the shadow of one’s 
own history is the German treatment of the Holocaust in the postwar devel-
opment of its collective identity. In the end, Germans were able to establish a 
memorial for the murdered European Jews close to the center of their 
national representation, the Reichstag, their parliament in Berlin.15 
 There are trends in other countries of Europe to enlarge this attitude of 
ambivalence and give it a European dimension.16 Let me give you a remark-
able example for addressing and expressing a national dark shadow, a gesture 
aimed at a new logic of cultural interaction, reconciliation. On December 7, 
1970, during his visit to Poland, German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt down 
in front of the Warsaw War monument, which commemorates the German 
destruction of the Polish capital. A similar gesture can be seen in an act of the 
former minister of domestic affairs in South Africa, Adriaan Vlok. He washed 
14 See Sharon Macdonald, ed., Approaches to European Historical Consciousness: 
Refl ections and Provocations (Hamburg: Edition Körber-Stiftung, 2000); Jörn 
Rüsen, “Future-Directed Elements of a European Historical Culture,” Taiwan 
Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (issue 8) (December 2007): 209–223; 
also in Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer, eds., The Many Faces of Clio, 
Cross-Cultural Approaches to Historiography: Essays in Honor of Georg G. 
Iggers (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 163–171; Internet: http://
www.talaljuk-ki.hu/index.php/article/articleview/428/1/62/.
15 See Jan-Holger Kirsch, Nationaler Mythos oder historische Trauer? Der Streit 
um ein zentrales “Holocaust-Mahnmal” für die Berliner Republik (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2003).
16 Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander, eds., Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical 
Cultures in Contemporary Europe (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003); 
Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander, eds., Holocaust Heritage: Inquiries into 
European Historical Culture (Malmö, Sweden: Sekel, 2004).
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the feet of the mothers and widows of black people killed by the apartheid 
forces, which he was responsible for. These gestures express guilt and respect 
for victims, as well as a profound change in looking at others. 
 Within the framework of a unifying Europe, the French-German relation-
ship has undergone a thorough change and may serve as a good example of a 
fundamental change in historical culture today. For centuries the two nations 
looked upon each other as “hereditary enemies.” But after two world wars 
and an incredible amount of bloodshed, this hostility between the two nations 
has changed into a relationship of cordial neighbors, if not friendship. Neither 
has given up its nationality, of course, but its character has changed. 
Nationality has adapted an inclusive quality, instead of an exclusive one, and 
is on the way toward a feeling of common Europeanness. On September 22, 
1984, French President François Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl shook and held hands on the battlefi eld of Verdun, the site of the blood-
iest encounter of the two nations during World War I. They thereby symboli-
cally staged this new paradigm of attitudes and feeling.
 These examples illustrate overcoming exclusive moralization as an ethno-
centric strategy for shaping self and otherness in recent times. It is an open 
question whether and how such progress will be used to change established 
ethnocentric attitudes of identity formation in favor of more humane 
elements. This question ought to be put to scholars working in the humanities 
and especially history. Here is an area where new elements for generating a 
sense of history can be developed. Here, where scholars are working on 
dimensions of identity formation, the humanism of mutual recognition can be 
shaped. Their work has nothing to do with kneeling down, washing feet, and 
shaking hands, of course, since these gestures are not modes of academic 
discourse. But by analyzing them and the factors and forces behind them, like 
mourning and forgiving,17 they transfer these mental attitudes into the realm 
of cognition. They prepare these attitudes for another platform, that of argu-
mentative discourse. The potential of these attitudes has not yet been applied 
to the distinctive nature of historical thinking. I know that this application is 
diffi cult, but it is all the more necessary. As I see it, ignorance is one of the 
most powerful obstacles to humanizing the processes of identity formation, 
along with refusal to recognize human suffering as one of the main categories 
of historical experience. There is considerable awareness of human agency in 
17 See Jörn Rüsen, “Emotional Forces in Historical Thinking: Some Metahistorical 
Refl ections and the Case of Mourning,” Historein: A Review of the Past and 
Other Stories 8 (2008): 41–53.
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historical studies, but hardly any of human suffering.18
 Cultural interaction, wherever it takes place, whether within East Asia or 
between East Asia and the West, ought to become much more aware of the 
infl uence of ethnocentrism and suffering in historical-identity formation. We 
should thus become more engaged in developing the possibilities of human-
izing these basic forms of understanding when we pursue our work as 
humanists and social scientists. It may lead to new forms of understanding 
one’s own culture and past, as well as those of the other.
18 A simple look in the dictionaries and encyclopedias of the humanities and social 
sciences may prove this blind spot. But there are exemptions; see, for 
example, Young-Tsu Wong, “Chinese History in the Age of Globalization,” 
Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 2 (issue 12) (December 2009): 
39–69, esp. 53–58.
